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A
s the costs of litigation continue to increase, in large 
part due to overly broad discovery, the skirmishes 
in motions to compel are taking on new importance 
as part of the strategy. Attorneys in large law firms 
are even developing a subpractice area known as 
“discovery counsel,” particularly with the explosion of e-discovery 
over electronically stored information. It is for another article to 
discuss whether discovery should become so large or complex that 
practitioners can specialize in it. Thus, it will not come as a surprise 
to anyone that parallel to this issue is the much sought after, but 
often illusory, claim for attorney’s fees. Clients certainly welcome 
the opportunity to collect attorney’s fees wherever possible to reim-
burse their own costs in litigation.
The ability to prevail on a claim for attorney’s fees requires coun-
sel to plan ahead early in the case. Simply winning a motion and then 
asking for fees will likely create problems in actually being able to 
present a justifiable claim. Too often, the twin barriers of poor time-
keeping records and inappropriate rates block a successful claim for 
fees. The case law demonstrates an absolute requirement that coun-
sel and parties understand what they will be required to prove to 
prevail on a fee claim at the outset of the case.
Introduction 
This article analyzes and provides a summary of the modern ap-
proach for calculating awards of attorney’s fees. Two methods in 
particular have prevailed since the early 1970s: one developed in 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Georgia Highway 
Express, Inc.,1 and the other just a year earlier in the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. Am. 
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.2 The Johnson case set forth 
12 factors (now called the Johnson Factor Test) that provided guid-
ance on the proper considerations for determining attorney’s fees. 
On the other side of the circuit split, the Lindy Bros. case pioneered 
the so-called lodestar method. That decision based the calculation of 
fees principally on two factors: rate charged and time spent, devis-
ing a method meant to eliminate the uncertainty and what was per-
ceived to be excessively wide discretion of trial court judges when 
determining fee awards. Over time, the lodestar method has come to 
be the predominant calculation in federal courts.3 
Attorney’s fees can be awarded in a wide variety of situations. 
Many of the main cases articulating the rules for attorney’s fee 
awards focus on fee-shifting provisions of civil rights statutes in-
tended to incentivize competent counsel to represent civil rights 
litigants who might otherwise go unrepresented, but the holdings 
set the standard for all awards. In the United States, courts generally 
abide by the American Rule, whereby each party funds its own legal 
counsel.4 However, there are exceptions in cases of punitive dam-
ages, civil rights fee-shifting statutes, and as a type of sanctions, to 
name a few. Regardless of the situation, courts insist that the party 
seeking fees be the prevailing party, either in the litigation as a whole 
or on the relevant motion. Generally a party may not recover attor-
ney’s fees with regard to claims on which they were unsuccessful in 
litigation. Courts even parse out which fees were spent in support 
of each claim, awarding fees only for claims on which plaintiff pre-
vailed—the “prevailing party” rule.5
While settled methods for calculating awards of attorney’s fees 
exist, trial court judges generally calculate the fees in particular 
cases. They are granted wide latitude to provide reasonable fee 
awards under an “abuse of discretion” standard of appellate review.6 
Although judges have considerable discretion, it is not boundless. 
One of the often-cited virtues of the lodestar method is its objectiv-
ity in fee calculation and insistence on accurate billing records and 
judicial reasoning, which makes for fairer awards and easier appel-
late review.
This article focuses first on the Johnson factor test and its meth-
od of operation before turning in greater detail to the lodestar test 
articulated in Lindy Bros. Finally, it will examine the criteria for any 
enhancements or changes to the award produced by the lodestar 
calculation with particular attention to the U.S. Supreme Court’s re-
cent decision in Perdue v. Kenny A ex rel. Winn.7
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Johnson Factor test
In light of a district court decision that failed to “elucidate the fac-
tors which contributed to [its] decision and upon which it was based,” 
Johnson set forth 12 factors that should be used to justify awards of 
attorney’s fees going forward. Although these factors have since been 
criticized for being too vague and giving trial court judges too much 
discretion, they were initially developed to cure exactly that problem. 
The 12 Factors8
Time and Labor Required
When counsel makes claims regarding the time and labor required 
to complete certain tasks, judges may weigh those claims against their 
own knowledge of how time-consuming a particular task is. Where 
more than one attorney bills time, a judge should be cognizant of the 
possibility of duplicated effort. Judges may also discount billed cleri-
cal work—they do not become more valuable simply because they are 
completed by a lawyer rather than a secretary or paralegal.
Novelty and Difficulty of Questions
In cases where an attorney is faced with matters of first impres-
sion, he or she may not have sufficient existing background knowl-
edge to adequately litigate the case. Accordingly, more research is 
required. Although this attainment of knowledge can be used in later 
cases, attorneys should not be dissuaded from taking on cases in 
which the law is unclear and may be developed.
Skill Required to Perform Legal Service Properly
Judges should carefully observe the work product of the attor-
neys involved in the litigation and ensure that they have the requi-
site skill to represent their client. The judge may use his own past 
experience to evaluate the lawyers in the particular case. If the at-
torneys do not exhibit the skill the court believes to be required for 
their role in the case, it can be a basis for lowering the fee award.
Preclusion of Other Employment Due to Acceptance of Case
If, by accepting the case at bar, an attorney forecloses the possibil-
ity of accepting other cases through a conflict of interest or minimizes 
the amount of time he or she has available to spend on other cases, 
that may weigh in the court’s mind as it calculates attorney’s fees.
Customary Fee
Courts should consider the customary fee for similar work in the 
community in which the litigation is occurring. With the understand-
ing that different types of legal work command different rates, the 
court should use fees for comparable services as a guideline for its 
awards. The Johnson court noted that fees should not, however, 
drop below the applicable statutory minimum in criminal cases. 
Whether Fee Is Fixed or Contingent
The judge may look to the fee quoted to the client or the percent-
age of recovery agreed to as an indicator of what the attorney’s fee 
expectations might have been. However, the court has an obliga-
tion to provide a reasonable fee, not necessarily one that the parties 
agreed to at the outset. Previous arrangements should serve only as 
a guide. Under no circumstances, however, should a litigant receive 
a fee greater than what he was contractually bound to pay.
Time Limitations Imposed by Client or Circumstance
When a lawyer takes on priority work that delays his other work, 
he is entitled to some level of premium. The court notes that this is 
particularly true in cases where counsel is called in to handle mat-
ters at a late stage in the litigation.
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Amount Involved and Results Obtained
Any award of attorney’s fees should be commensurate with the 
amount of the damages in the case and the magnitude of the result 
obtained. If the case monumentally changes the law and has effects 
far beyond the present litigation, the attorney’s fees awarded should 
be more substantial.
Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Attorney
As a general rule, more experienced attorneys should receive 
more compensation, but courts should be careful to ensure that the 
attorney’s ability comports with his experience. Experienced but 
ineffective counsel should not be rewarded, and inexperienced but 
outstanding counsel should not be punished for their lack of tenure.
“Undesirability” of Case
Attorneys who take on unpopular cases in their community may 
face hardships because of their desire to help an unpopular civil 
rights litigant. Because the decision to take on such a case may re-
sult in a loss of other business, the attorney should be better com-
pensated to accommodate that loss.
Nature and Length of Professional Relationship with Client
The court should understand that an attorney may vary his fee 
for similar work in light of the relationship his office has with a client. 
In determining what would be a reasonable attorney’s fee, courts 
should take note of these relationships and alter their proposed 
awards accordingly.
Awards in Similar Cases
In reaching a reasonable award amount, courts should consider 
awards in similar litigation, even if it took place outside the court’s 
jurisdiction. Excessive awards can be prevented if judges are operat-
ing within the bounds of other courts’ decisions.
Criticism of the Johnson approach
These factors were designed to quell judicial overreach and pro-
vide an incentive to attorneys to take difficult cases without also 
unduly enriching them. Despite Johnson’s efforts, some courts have 
criticized the 12-factor approach for providing an opportunity for 
judges to exercise exactly the type of limitless decision-making it 
was designed to prevent. In Perdue, for example, Justice Samuel 
Alito wrote that the 12 factors “gave very little actual guidance to 
district courts. Setting attorney’s fees by reference to a series of 
sometimes subjective factors placed unlimited discretion in trial 
judges and produced disparate results.”9 Although the Supreme 
Court did not squarely overrule the Johnson approach, it effective-
ly abandoned it in Hensley.10 In Perdue, the Court reaffirmed its 
preference for the lodestar model. Although the test was abrogated, 
many of the factors were subsumed in the lodestar approach, albeit 
in different form.
lodestar Model
When it comes to attorney’s fees awards, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has expressed a clear preference for the lodestar approach articulat-
ed in Lindy Bros. It is intended to be a definitive guide for determin-
ing attorney’s awards, and in fact the very name “lodestar” means 
“guide.” The goal of the lodestar method as stated by the Court is 
to simplify the fee award process and make it more objective. Under 
lodestar, courts are to calculate attorney’s fees by multiplying 1) a 
reasonable hourly rate by 2) the number of hours reasonably and 
necessarily spent performing the legal services at issue.11 That basic 
formulation is composed of just two elements, but each entails con-
siderable analysis of what is and is not “reasonable.” Each of those 
elements will be explored in more detail below.
Among those already listed, the Supreme Court articulates sev-
eral “virtues” of the approach. First, lodestar looks to the prevailing 
market rates in the relevant legal community to determine a reason-
able rate. The goal is to produce an award that roughly approximates 
the prevailing rate the attorney would have received if he or she 
had been representing a paying client billed by the hour in a compa-
rable case. Secondly, lodestar is more readily administrable than the 
Johnson approach. Finally, it is more objective. Lodestar removes 
considerable discretion from the hands of trial court judges and per-
mits meaningful appellate review with more predictable results both 
for the court and for the parties.12 
Where the lodestar method is used, the fee applicant must prove, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the fee requested is reason-
able.13 The Court also states that whatever fee award the lodestar 
calculation produces has a strong presumption of reasonableness.14 
Johnson Factors and the lodestar analysis
Although lodestar is the primary fee calculation method, the 
court did not eliminate the Johnson factors. Perdue emphasized 
that “the lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant fac-
tors constituting a ‘reasonable attorney’s fee,’” meaning the lodestar 
calculation incorporates many of the Johnson factors. The court in 
McAfee v. Boczar reasoned that the first element of lodestar (rea-
sonable hourly rate) encompasses factor 5 (the customary fee), fac-
tor 6 (whether fee is fixed or contingent), factor 9 (the experience, 
reputation, and ability of the attorney), and factor 4 (the preclusion 
of other employment due to acceptance of the case). The second 
major lodestar element (reasonable time spent), incorporates fac-
tor 1 (time and labor required), factor 2 (novelty and difficulty of 
questions), and factor 7 (time limitations imposed by client or cir-
cumstances).15 Thus, the lodestar analysis subsumes and completely 
accounts for eight of the Johnson factors. But this excludes four 
factors—factor 8 (the amount involved and results obtained), fac-
tor 10 (the “undesirability” of the case), factor 11 (the nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client), and factor 12 
(awards in similar cases).16
Perhaps due in part to how recently the Perdue opinion was 
issued, courts have not provided a significant amount of guidance 
regarding how to administer and implement these four remaining 
Johnson factors in conjunction with the lodestar calculation. In 
McAfee, the court did briefly wrestle with the issue, ultimately con-
cluding that the added factors did not warrant a result different from 
that yielded by the lodestar calculation.17 In that case, the court con-
sidered whether the results obtained (Johnson factor 8) warranted 
a different result, ultimately concluding that the lodestar calculation 
adequately encompassed the necessary factors. The four remaining 
factors should not be considered in every case, but if a party has 
reason to believe they may be relevant, that party can raise the issue 
for the court’s consideration. Because there is a presumption that 
lodestar yields a reasonable fee on its own, successful invocation of 
those additional factors will likely be a rare occurrence. 
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lodestar elements
With a basic understanding of the background of the lodestar 
calculation and the interplay with the Johnson factors, we move to 
a more detailed analysis of each of lodestar’s two main elements: 
reasonable hourly rate and reasonable time spent.
Reasonable Hourly Rate
The starting point under the lodestar method for determining a 
reasonable hourly rate is to look to the community in which the court 
sits.18 This reflects a broader theme of the approach—looking at com-
parable attorneys doing similar work in the locality. If counsel is from 
out of town and no local attorney is available for rate comparison be-
cause of a unique specialization, then the court must consider two 
questions to determine whether an exception can be made. First, the 
court will ask whether services of like quality are truly unavailable in 
the area, and secondly, whether the party choosing the attorney from 
elsewhere acted reasonably in making that choice.19 The burden is on 
the fee applicant to establish the existence of the exception.
Should no comparable attorney be available in the relevant juris-
diction, the court may then consider rates from other communities. 
The central question is whether the case presents an issue requir-
ing specialized legal skills not available within the court’s jurisdic-
tion. The magnitude of the case alone is usually not sufficient to 
warrant obtaining remote counsel; the question is limited to area 
of specialization. In SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. v. AIG United Guar-
anty Corp., for example, the court held that it was not reasonable 
for Richmond attorneys to use the rate charged by Gibson Dunn 
lawyers from Washington, D.C., New York, and Los Angeles, even 
though those rates were discounted.20 The chief question is what the 
reasonable rate in Richmond would be. Courts have acknowledged 
that different categories of legal work have correspondingly differ-
ent rates, and this is a factor the court considers as well. Addition-
ally, under the lodestar calculation, the reasonableness of the rate is 
a concept that does not vary depending on whether the hourly rate 
is assessed for compensatory or punitive purposes.21 
Reasonable Time Spent
In addition to establishing a reasonable rate, the court must be 
certain that a reasonable amount of time was spent. Under lodestar, 
courts look to several factors to make this determination. 
Number of Lawyers
One of the factors used to determine whether a reasonable 
amount of time was spent is to look to the number of lawyers in-
volved in particular tasks. In SunTrust, the party challenging the 
fee application pointed to two examples of alleged overreach. One 
was a status conference attended by seven lawyers where total fees 
claimed for the day topped $40,000. The second was a motion for 
sanctions hearing during which five partners, four associates, and a 
paralegal were present, with total fees of more than $92,000.22 The 
court held that the number of timekeepers present was excessive 
and that the fee applicant demonstrated a “lack of billing judgment.” 
Where multiple lawyers are present, fee applicants must be meticu-
lous in demonstrating that every present timekeeper was required 
to accomplish the task at hand, otherwise some of their time may 
be deducted.
These two examples demonstrate concerns of not thinking stra-
tegically ahead of time with respect to the possible attorney’s fee 
award. Most courts would struggle with justifying nine lawyers to 
attend a hearing on any issue. It is paramount that lead counsel in 
cases have the background and ability to staff events in the case in 
such a manner to justify a fee award. 
With regard to sanctions, the court’s assessment of reasonable-
ness as to the number of hours is limited to the time spent attempt-
ing to resolve issues with respect to the sanctionable conduct. Where 
an investigation into potentially sanctionable conduct is proceeding 
alongside normal discovery, the time spent in discovery is not rea-
sonable to include in the fee application.23
Detailed Time Records
The party seeking award of fees must submit evidence to support 
the hours worked and “where the documentation of hours is inade-
quate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.”24 Prop-
er documentation is the key to ascertaining the number of hours 
reasonably spent on legal tasks. Adequate documentation is found 
in a time entry which “reflects reliable, contemporaneous recorda-
tion of time spent on legal tasks that are described with reasonable 
particularity.”25 Where fee applicants group or lump several tasks 
together under a single time entry without specifying the time spent 
on each task, courts may find inadequate information on which to 
base a review and deduct the time from the award.26 Where courts 
find the billing information too vague, there are two principal ways 
of reducing the award. First, they may identify and disallow specific 
hours that it determines are not adequately documented. Second-
ly, it may reduce the overall fee award by a fixed percentage or an 
amount determined based on the court’s familiarity with the case, 
its complexity, and counsel involved.27 
Many law firms use a block billing approach. While the client may 
not mind such an approach in its invoices, the block billing method 
is problematic in seeking fees under the lodestar calculation. The 
same can be said of vague time entries. Tasked-based billing records 
with thorough descriptions best support a claim for attorney’s fees 
in a lodestar calculation. 
Under lodestar, courts are particularly reluctant to delve into 
the realm of trying to interpret unclear billing entries. That kind of 
guesswork would harken back to the days of using the Johnson fac-
tors and their accompanying subjectivity. Block billing under lode-
star is not strictly forbidden, but it is heavily discouraged. Sloppiness 
and vagueness in time entry will only result in deductions from the 
With regard to sanctions, the court’s 
assessment of reasonableness as to the 
number of hours is limited to the time spent 
attempting to resolve issues with respect 
to the sanctionable conduct. Where an 
investigation into potentially sanctionable 
conduct is proceeding alongside normal 
discovery, the time spent in discovery is not 
reasonable to include in the fee application.
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overall award. In SunTrust, the court encouraged parties to open 
separate billing files for discrete issues on which attorney’s fees may 
later be sought so as to facilitate a clean line between those fees 
charged in connection with the general litigation and those charged 
for the insular issue.28
Expenses
In the SunTrust case, the court deducted a number of expenses 
it deemed to be frivolous. For example, overnight deliveries to ex-
perts were subtracted from the overall award. The court also deter-
mined that certain tasks outsourced to a consulting firm could have 
been accomplished more inexpensively, and those expenditures 
were therefore deducted.29 When out-of-town lawyers were con-
sulted and in-town counsel was available, not only could out-of-town 
counsel’s higher rates be deducted, but so could their travel time 
and any other expenses higher than those that would reasonably be 
charged by in-town counsel. The lesson to be learned here is simi-
lar to the theme running through other deductions. Under lodestar, 
courts are looking to ensure that counsel is spending its time and 
resources in the most efficient way possible. Where spending can 
be construed as extravagant and unnecessary, a court may very well 
be inclined to reduce those fees in the ultimate award. The guiding 
principle for firms hoping to collect attorney’s fees should be com-
mon sense and consistent evaluation of the necessity of its spending 
decisions.
Fee enhancements
There is a strong presumption that when applied correctly, the 
lodestar method yields a reasonable, sufficient award amount.30 
However, some courts have tried to, for various reasons, give awards 
that go above or below the lodestar amount. Traditionally, the Su-
preme Court has been reticent to allow these moves. Justice Alito 
noted in Perdue that the Court has never approved one of these 
so-called enhancements.31 While the Court has not outright forbade 
them, it has consistently held that enhancements would be allowed 
only in rare and exceptional circumstances.32 To justify it, a judge 
must explain why the lodestar amount did not yield a reasonable 
fee, setting forth the necessary factors that were not encapsulated 
in its calculation.33
The Court has placed great faith in the lodestar calculation in-
sofar as it believes that most, if not all, of the factors necessary to 
derive a reasonable attorney’s fee are accounted for. That does not 
leave much to be considered after the calculation is complete. Even 
where fee applicants believed they had a justifiable reason for en-
hancing the fee, courts have held that those reasons are subsumed 
in the lodestar calculation. For example, courts have held that the 
result obtained, good as it may be, does not justify an enhancement 
because good results are the function of an attorney’s superior per-
formance, which is encapsulated in the lodestar calculation.34 Like-
wise, the novelty and complexity of a case is not grounds for en-
hancement because those aspects are adequately reflected in the 
number of hours billed, which is a part of the lodestar calculation.35 
Although the Court has never upheld a fee enhancement, it has 
described three situations in which such an enhancement would 
be appropriate. 36 First, an enhancement may be proper where the 
method employed in determining the hourly rate does not adequate-
ly measure the attorney’s true market value as demonstrated in part 
during the litigation. To provide an objective and reviewable calcula-
tion, a judge who wishes to change an hourly rate on this basis must 
give specific proof linking the attorney’s ability to a prevailing mar-
ket rate. Second, an enhancement may be justified if an attorney’s 
performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the 
litigation is exceptionally protracted. The Court suggests that if an 
enhancement is granted on this basis, it must be done in a way that 
is objective and easily reviewed on appeal, such as by applying a 
standard interest rate to the qualifying outlays of expense. Finally, 
an enhancement may be appropriate where a delay in the payment 
of fees results in additional costs assumed by the attorney. This is 
particularly worthy of an enhancement where the opposing counsel 
unjustifiably causes the delay.
If judges enhance the amount yielded by the lodestar calculation, 
it must be for good reason and made explicit or it will likely be over-
turned as arbitrary on appeal. In Perdue, the trial court provided a 
flat 75 percent enhancement to the award, and the Supreme Court 
found that because no evidence was offered, it was arbitrary.37 When 
courts award enhancements on such an impressionistic basis, they 
undermine the objectivity and reviewable nature that are the hall-
marks of the lodestar method.
Conclusion
In cases involving fee-shifting statutes or the award of attorney’s 
fees in general, the federal courts have decidedly shifted from evalu-
ation based on the Johnson factors to the lodestar method for cal-
culation. That shift was a marked attempt to bring more objectivity 
to the fee-calculation process, curb the discretion of district court 
judges, make the awards more readily reviewable on appeal, and 
generally produce more predictable results for all parties involved. 
The lodestar test is simple on its face: multiply the reasonable hours 
spent by a reasonable rate. The product of that calculation is pre-
sumptively reasonable, and because it accounts for most, if not all 
of the factors to be taken into consideration, enhancements to the 
lodestar amount are generally not favored, though they are permit-
ted in theory. 
The takeaway point for practitioners who may be filing or chal-
lenging fee applications is that determining what constitutes a rea-
sonable fee or a reasonable amount of time spent may be more dif-
ficult than it first appears. The general principles of objectivity and 
producing an easily reviewable result guide courts’ consideration. 
Additionally, practitioners should be vigilant in their billing practices 
and staffing decisions to ensure that money is not being wasted. 
Under lodestar, courts may easily excise wasted time and expenses 
from the award. If attorneys want to be fully reimbursed for their 
time after the litigation has concluded, they need to be cognizant 
of the somewhat tight timekeeping standards courts impose. Keep-
ing these principles in mind and understanding the lodestar calcula-
tion process should yield awards that fully encompass the attorney’s 
expenses or provide grounds to challenge a fee application that is 
insufficiently thorough. 
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